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2INTRODUCTION
The internationalisation of emerging multinational enterprises (EMNEs) and their
anticipated future prospects are among the most significant recent changes in the global
economy (Child & Marinova, 2014; Kang & Jiang, 2012; Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick
& Forsans, 2016a). In 2014, 132 EMNEs entered the Fortune Global 500 list and the
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flow from emerging economies was
US$ 759 billion, equating to 39% of global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows
(UNCTAD 2014). Among these active EMNEs, Chinese MNEs have attracted the most
attention, particularly since the implementation of the ‘Go Global’ policy in October
2000 (BEA, 2005; Deng, 2009; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). Scholars argue that
Chinese MNEs are distinctive in certain respects, with implications for traditional
international business (IB) theory (Alon, Child, Li, & McIntyre, 2011; Boisot & Meyer,
2008; Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Zheng, Voss, & Liu, 2007; Child & Rodriguez, 2005; Cui
& Jiang, 2012; Ramaswamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). The influence of Chinese MNEs
on the world’s economy is increasing. Of the 132 EMNEs in the Fortune Global 500 list,
89 are Chinese MNEs, contributing US$ 116 billion to global FDI flows.
Recently, the number and scale of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
by Chinese MNEs have also started to accelerate (Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012) – a
phenomenon which has attracted controversy in political circles but little academic
scrutiny. According to UNCTAD (2014), in 2014 alone, Chinese MNEs spent over
US$ 50 billion undertaking cross-border M&As. One of the issues is the rationale
underlying cross-border M&As, as an increasing number of acquisitions are targeted at
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Chinese government’s interventions still influence these firms (Luo, Xue, & Han,
2010), which results in incautious investment decisions, in particular in the apparent
lack of risk analysis. The Economist (2010) claims that, due to its opaque nature,
China’s important role as a foreign investor has been interpreted as a threat to countries
in the west and sub-Saharan Africa (Bond, 2006; Brautigam, 2009). As a result, some
M&A deals proposed by Chinese MNEs have been stalled, e.g., Rio Tinto-Chinalco
deal (BBC, 2009). In addition, Chinese MNEs are alleged to have low international
business management ability and a lack of coherent overseas investment strategies
(Wang, 2011). Scholars (e.g., Child & Marinova, 2014) suggest that the empirical basis
of these remarks on China’s M&As require much more careful analysis to investigate
the motivations of Chinese cross-border M&As, along with home and host country
contexts to explain the location choices made by Chinese MNEs.
Scholars have carried out a great deal of research on the motives of China's OFDI
and into the applicability of traditional frameworks of analysis (Buckley et al., 2007;
Cheng & Ma, 2010; Cheung & Qian, 2009; Deng, 2004; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012;
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Sun et al., 2012). However, traditional
investment motives, such as market size, labour costs, and resource endowments,
originally developed in a western context, provide only a partial explanation of Chinese
OFDI location strategies. Therefore, more work, taking into account the specific
attributes of emerging economies, is called for (Cheng, 2014; Cui & Jiang, 2012;
Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014; Morck, Yeung, & Zhou,
42008; Ramaswamy et al., 2012; Wang, Hong, Kafouros & Boateng, 2012). The
contribution of this paper therefore lies in exploring the institutional contexts both at
home and in host countries to explain the motivation and location choices made by
Chinese MNEs through cross-border M&As.
The institution-based view is utilized as it is one of the most appropriate theoretical
frameworks for probing business activities of MNEs from emerging economies
(Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). Unlike developed economies, where
the ‘rules of the game’ are well developed (Peng, 2002), the institutional framework in
emerging countries is often local context specific. Institutional constraints at home and
in host countries (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008) influence the
strategic behaviour of EMNEs (Cui & Jiang, 2010; Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick &
Forsans, 2016b). For instance, OFDI by Chinese MNEs requires approval by several
Chinese authorities, and only those investment projects in line with the catalogue of
‘encouraged’ OFDI and in strict accord with government policies are allowed (Buckley
et al., 2007; Pei & Zheng, 2015; Zhang et al., 2011). Thus, it is argued that an
institution-based view is needed to explain Chinese cross-border M&As (Child &
Marinova, 2014; Meyer et al., 2009; Pajunen, 2008). A few empirical examinations of
Chinese OFDI have taken into account institutional factors (e.g., Boisot & Meyer, 2008;
Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung & Qian, 2009; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Mork et al., 2008;
Zhang et al., 2011), but they have not comprehensively modelled institutions in their
empirical estimations, and thus did not obtain consistent results. Meyer et al. (2009)
argue that macro-level institutions, such as country-level legal and political
5frameworks, have remained as mere ‘background’ and thus remain relatively
unexplored.
The second contribution of this paper lies in a systematic and comprehensive
examination of Chinese cross-border M&As undertaken during the period 1985–2011.
We argue that Chinese cross-border M&As are worthy of a separate examination
because they have become the main form of OFDI by Chinese MNEs. Previous studies
on Chinese MNEs have largely focused on greenfield investments (Duanmu, 2012;
Kang & Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012), which, in fact, are likely to be determined
by a separate set of factors (Bertrand & Madariaga, 2002; Mata & Portugal, 2000;
Nicholson & Salaber, 2013; Nocke & Yeaple, 2008; Sun et al., 2012; Xia, Ma, Lu, &
Liu, 2013). Second, prior studies suffer from sample selection bias and use approved
FDI data rather than actual investment or use qualitative case studies (Boateng, Qian, &
Tianle, 2008; Buckley et al., 2007; Deng, 2009; Hertenstein, Sutherland, & Anderson,
2015; Rui & Tip, 2008). Third, prior studies did not recognize that location choice and
the volume of FDI are two different decisions. Thus, prior studies have potentially
biased results. We account for these limitations by: first, creating a comprehensive
dataset of completed cross-border M&As; second, our dataset includes countries which
do not host M&As by Chinese MNEs; third, we use the Heckman two stage model,
which examines the location choice decision in the first stage and the volume of
investment in the second stage (Heckman, 1979).
In the next section, we describe our dataset on Chinese overseas M&As. In the
third section, we review the literature and formulate our hypotheses on location
6strategies of Chinese M&As. The fourth section explains the econometric models, data
and variables. Our results are discussed in the fifth section. The final section discusses
management implications and concludes.
CHINESE CROSS-BORDER M&AS
Our dataset is derived from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database. It contains the
most detailed record of global M&A transactions, and therefore, is the world's most
authoritative and widely used M&A data source. We extracted all cases of China's
cross-border M&A transactions during January 1985 to December 2011. During this
period, 2085 acquisitions were announced and, of these, 1192 were actually completed.
China's overseas M&As were rare before 1991 (see Figure 1). They began to
increase steadily from 1992, largely due to the building of China's market economy
after Deng Xiaoping's ‘southern tour’. The real boom in overseas M&As by Chinese
MNEs occurred only after China's entry to the WTO in 2002 (Buckley et al., 2007). For
instance, between 2002 and 2011, Chinese firms publicly announced their intention to
undertake 1683 cross-border M&As, amounting to US$ 257.65 billion, of which 936
deals, amounting to US$ 143.76 billion, were completed. In these 10 years, both
announced and completed M&As were four to five times more than the total number of
M&As announced and completed over the period 1985–2001. Our data also shows that
the average transaction size has grown annually and the M&As completion rate has
stabilized at around 60%.
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Our data further show that Chinese MNEs have undertaken cross border M&As in tax
havens, such as the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and the Isle of
Man. These acquisitions were excluded because the primary motive of such
transactions is tax planning and the final destination of the investment is not known.
Table 1 shows the main target countries for Chinese MNEs. Hong Kong is at the top of
the list with 392 M&As, followed by the US and Australia. Scholars (e.g., Peng et al.,
2009) suggest that Chinese MNEs use Hong Kong as a strategic staging post for their
further investments and also to develop financing channels for the parent firms. For
these reasons we also exclude Hong Kong. After these exclusions, our final sample
totals 760 acquisitions hosted in 80 target countries.
It is interesting to note that developed countries in the West, e.g., US, Canada,
Germany, UK, and France, are among top location choices for Chinese M&As. This is
a relatively new phenomenon – an outcome of the ‘Go Global’ policy – which presents
an intriguing case for the study of motivation of Chinese MNEs in seeking strategic
assets available in these western economies, as compared to the previous strategy of
investing in neighbouring countries for natural resource seeking purposes. Nicolas and
Thomsen (2009) suggest that Chinese firms are investing in these European countries
to seek brands and technology. These authors observed that some Chinese automobile
firms have taken over small Italian firms in Turin to gain their technology and design
capabilities. This is also likely to benefit the acquirer firms from the spillovers arising
8from the Moncalieri science and technology park in the vicinity.
The ‘Go Global’ policy has pushed Chinese MNEs to enhance their technological
capabilities (Pei & Zheng, 2015). In 2006, Chinese firms accounted for 2.8% of total
R&D projects by foreign investors in Europe – rising from virtually zero in 2001
(Nicolas & Thomsen, 2009). The latest ‘Science, Technology and Industry Outlook’
published by the OECD (2014) further suggests that the research intensity of Chinese
firms has massively increased. China has edged out the European Union in terms of
investment in R&D with its R&D to GDP ratio touching 2%.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Unlocking the Black Box of Chinese M&As Location Strategies: An Institutional
Framework
Scholars argue that traditional theoretical frameworks of FDI have largely examined
the location choice decisions in terms of transaction costs and the MNE’s motivation in
undertaking FDI (Yang et al., 2009). Consequently, the importance and the impact of
institutions in the international business literature has remained ‘thin’ (Jackson & Deeg,
2008: 540). However, the rise of the ‘institution-based view’ during the past decade has
brought a new perspective to the explanation of MNEs’ cross-border activities (Peng et
al., 2009). It highlights the influence of the institutional framework embedded in
national-level macro environments on the strategic choices available to the firm (Cui &
Jiang, 2010; Buckley, Forsans & Munjal, 2012). Davis and North (1971: 6) initially
defined the institutional framework as ‘the set of fundamental political, social, and
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Thus, unlike the traditional frameworks of FDI, the institution-based view looks
beyond the micro-level organization structure of the firm and its task environment
(Peng et al., 2009; Wu & Sia, 2002).
The institution-based constructs applied to FDI decisions originate from ‘new
institutional theory’ which defines institutions as formal and informal ‘rules of the
game’ (North, 1990: 3) codified in the form of ‘regulative, normative, culture-cognitive
elements, that together with associated activities and resources, provide meaning and
stability’ (Scott, 1995: 56) to business organisations. Scholars (Child & Marinova, 2014)
suggest that institutional analysis of FDI decisions should be ‘sensitive’ to both home
and host country contexts in order to systematically comprehend their implications on
the firm investing into foreign countries. In the next two sections, we analyse the effect
of the institutional framework at home and in host countries on the Chinese MNEs’
decision to undertake cross-border M&As.
The Institutional Framework in the Home Country
Some scholars predict that in a new era of Schumpeterian global competition and
innovation, governments in emerging economies are pressured to support OFDI
promotion policies that enhance firm’s competitiveness and encourage innovation
(Gammeltoft, 2012). In this respect, the Chinese government’s influence on the
internationalisation decisions of Chinese MNEs has been subject to close academic
scrutiny. This is primarily because, unlike western countries and (also) other
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developing countries like India, the Chinese government’s degree of involvement with
the internationalisation decisions of Chinese MNEs is staggeringly high and with its
state involvement based internationalisation model, Chinese MNEs have had a strong
impact on the world economy.
The Chinese government’s policy direction on OFDI seems to have influenced
Chinese MNEs’ location choices and motivations of internationalisation (Quer et al.,
2012; Richet, 2013; Yang et al., 2009). As discussed above, Chinese FDI follows the
government’s catalogue which directs where and how FDI should be made. This
directive is often driven by the political and strategic objectives of the Chinese
government, e.g., its need to fuel the manufacturing base at home (Globerman &
Shapiro, 2009). Consequently, countries with large endowments of natural resources
were preferred location choices of Chinese enterprises (Ramasamy et al., 2012).
Investments by the ‘big three’ state owned enterprises, namely CNPC, CNOOC, and
Sinopec, into African countries, in the 1990s, illustrate this argument (Cheung et al.,
2012; Yao & Wang, 2013).
Since the launch of the ‘Go Global’ policy, in 2002, Chinese OFDI policy has
liberalized the sectors where FDI can be made by Chinese MNEs. There seems to be a
thrust on strengthening of the technological and market competitiveness of Chinese
MNEs. In October 2004, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
and the China Export-Import Bank jointly issued a ‘Policy Notice on the State's
Encouragements of Key Foreign Investment Projects by Credit Support’ to supplement
the ‘Go Global’ policy. According to the joint notice, special financial assistance is
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available for supporting investments for: firstly, setting up overseas research and
development centres which may utilize internationally advanced technologies,
management experiences and professional talents; and secondly, cross-border M&As
which can improve the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, and
accelerate the exploration of international markets. Moreover, in 2009, the Ministry of
Commerce and the Ministry of Science and Technology jointly issued ‘Opinions on
Encouraging Technology Export’ which encourages foreign collaborations and
cross-border M&As by Chinese enterprises engaged in the development of technology.
Consequent to these policy changes, in the post 2002 period, the motivation of
cross-border M&As undertaken by Chinese MNEs seems to be changing. Deng (2009)
observes that an increasing number of Chinese firms are investing in developed
economies by aggressive M&A, and contends that government support is an important
determinant. Chinese MNEs use M&As in advanced countries as a springboard for
acquiring strategic assets (Luo & Tung, 2007); for instance, machinery in Germany,
designs in Italy and automobiles in the UK (Nicolas & Thomsen, 2009). UNCTAD
(2005) further points out that the Chinese government actively encourages OFDI in
overseas R&D centres as a result of which China has emerged as the largest foreign
investor in R&D projects in Europe. We thus argue that strong government directions
have made Chinese M&As more sectorally and geographically diversified and
hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 1a: The ‘Go Global’ policy has pushed Chinese cross-border M&As
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into countries that have a larger pool of strategic assets. (The location choice)
Hypothesis 1b: Chinese MNEs invest a larger volume of funds in cross-border
M&As in countries that have a larger pool of strategic assets. (The amount of
investment)
Thus, our first hypothesis (1a) is that Chinese M&As locate where they can acquire
strategic assets and our second hypothesis (1b) concerns the investment amount in
these M&As.
The Institutional Framework in Host Countries
MNE’s location choices are determined by the host country’s economic and
non-economic attributes. The economic attributes consist of factors such as market size,
and natural resources; whereas non-economic attributes consist of legal, social, and
political factors. While the role of economic factors is well documented in the extant
literature (see Dunning & Lundan, 2008 for a detailed discussion), it is the social, legal
and political forces that make up the institutional framework of host country that
influence the EMNE location choice in a different way from traditional MNEs. For
instance, a good governance structure in a host country reduces the degree of political
risk, thereby increasing its attractiveness for international business, and vice versa
(Blonigen, 2005; Robock, 1971). However, in contrast, research suggests that EMNEs
have experience of, and high tolerance towards political risk, which makes them
different from western MNEs, and therefore political risk may not negatively affect
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their location choice decision (Buckley et al., 2007; Buckley, Enderwick, Forsans and
Munjal, 2013; Munjal, 2014).
Prior research on the context of Chinese MNEs confirms that Chinese MNEs are
less risk averse than their western counterparts (Li & Liang, 2012; Kolastad & Wigg,
2012; Quer et al., 2012). The difference in their attitude towards political risk is
attributable to number of factors. First, Chinese MNEs (especially SOEs) have fewer
financial constraints on OFDI and the imperfect domestic capital market creates a
specific financial advantage (Voss et al. 2008). In the context of Chinese MNEs, special
institutions at home, such as the government’s direction and financial support, may lead
to unconventional location choices by Chinese MNEs. Large and rapidly growing
domestic markets give them enough cash to invest abroad, and some Chinese SOEs
often have access to cheap state finance. For instance, the China Development Bank
and the China Export and Import Bank are committed to provide the best possible
service to help Chinese firms to invest overseas (Buckley et al., 2007; Dohse et al.,
2012; Economist, 2010; Rui & Yip, 2008). Such privileges reduce the commercial or
financial risks of OFDI, mitigate institutional distance and subsidize less profitable
technology. Secondly, Chinese investors are attracted towards risky environments
when strong bilateral political relations exist between China and the host country as this
may reduce potential risk (Amighini et al. 2012). Third, Chinese investors are attracted
to the short term economic rents that arise in risky host countries. Moreover, Chinese
MNEs’ also exhibit indifference towards the institutional conditions in host countries
because of their experience of operating at home and in other developing countries with
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poor governance structures (Buckley et al., 2007; Quer et al., 2012). Therefore, we
hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 2a: Chinese M&As are not negatively associated with high levels of
political risk in host countries. (The location choice)
Hypothesis 2b: Chinese MNEs undertake larger M&As in locations that are riskier.
(The amount of investment)
Thus, our third hypothesis (2a) is that Chinese M&As locate in high risk countries and
our fourth hypothesis (2b) concerns the amount invested in M&As in high risk
countries.
METHODS AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
We use Heckman’s two-stage model (Helpman et al., 2008) to examine our hypotheses
- 1a and 2a on location choice and 1b and 2b on investment amount. Heckman’s
two-stage model allow us to examine the firm’s decision to undertake cross-border
M&As at two different levels as illustrated in Figure 2 and to estimate unbiased results
by including countries which did not host M&As by Chinese MNEs.
****Insert Figure 2 about here****
In the first stage, Chinese firms consider whether to conduct M&A in host country c
or not. If yes, they will decide M&A volume in the second stage. Suppose cty
represents China’s real M&A volume in host country c in year t , and we have:
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correlated with 1ctX  , and if we neglect this ratio in the regression, the condition of
independence assumption (CIA) will be violated and sample selection bias will happen.
Therefore, we need to consider an excluded variable (ENTCOST) that exists in the
first-stage equation but is not included in second-stage equation in order to avoid
multi-collinearity between inverse Mill’s ratio and the independent variables. Since we
are mainly interested in the impacts brought about by institutional constraints, the
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excluded variable in our study should describe the institutional quality in the host
country.
ENTCOST stands for entry cost which is measured using indicators provided in the
World Bank's Doing Business report. The Doing Business reports have a
comprehensive set of indicators widely used for the measurement of firms' entry costs.
However, Doing Business reports have two major limitations: 1) the time series in the
Doing Business reports starts from 2003, while the time span in our research is from
1985 to 2012; 2) the yearly change of the indicator in one country and the relative rank
among the countries are small. In order to resolve these limitations we follow Helpman
et al. (2008) by taking the average value of the Doing Business indicators from 2003 to
2011 as the entry cost for each country. We then calculated medians values for our
sample of 150 countries. On this basis, we generated a dummy variable of entry costs.
For countries with entry cost greater or equal to the median, the value of 1 is assigned
and for countries with entry cost less than the median, the value of 0 is assigned.
Therefore, first-stage location choice specification is:
Pr (yct* >0) = α + β1 Ict-1+ β2 x'ct-1+ β3 ENTCOST ct + μ ct （4）
Based on equation (4), we include Inverse Mill’s ratio in second-stage specification:
yct* = α + β1 Ict-1+ β2 x'ct-1+ β4 Mill ct + μ ct （5）
SAMPLE, DATA, AND VARIABLES
Sample
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Our M&A data are taken from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database, and we
only consider Chinese M&A transactions which have been actually completed. M&A
deals during the period of 1985-2011[1] were examined. In order to eliminate the sample
selection bias, common in traditional research, in studying the location choice we
include 70 countries whose transaction volumes are zero. We selected these countries
on the basis of their economic and non-economic attributes, such as market size, natural
resource and strategic asset endowments, so that the two groups of countries are
comparable. Thus, our sample of econometric regressions contains 150 countries in a
period of 27 years.[2]
Data and Variables
Independent variables. Our main independent variable is the quality of the host
countries’ institutions. It was measured in two ways: 1) Government Stability and 2)
Law and Order. Both factors are important for the FDI decision as these make up the
basic fabric of the institutional structure of any country. The stability of the central
government, the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the observance of the
law in a given host country boosts the investor’s confidence motivating them to first
choose the location for investment and second undertake larger investment. Data for
both variables are obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
published by the PRS Group. This is a popular database which provides a
comprehensive score for more than 150 countries from 1980 onwards. These two
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indicators are expressed in logarithmic form, higher scores indicating better
institutional environment.
The definitions and statistical description of variables are summarized in Table 2.
****Insert Table 2 about here****
Control Variables
We control for the standard attributes of host countries, including market size, growth
rate, natural resources, and geographic distance, in order to control for heterogeneity
among host countries. These are standard variables and have been included as controls
in prior research. A brief description of these variables is as follows:
Market. We include three measures, namely GDP, per capita GDP (GDPPC) and GDP
growth rate (GDPG). GDP measures the market size (Buckley et al., 2007; 2012); per
capita GDP (GDPPC) is used to measure the market purchasing power (Bénassy-Quéré
et. al., 2007; Yao & Wang, 2013); and GDP growth rate (GDPG) is used to judge host
countries’ growth potential (Billington, 1999; Zhang & Daly, 2011). It is an also an
indicator of a country’s political stability and the government’s economic track record
(Fan et al., 2009). GDP and per capita GDP are in logarithmic form. The data are
obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
Natural resources. Following Buckley et al. (2007, 2012) and Kolstad et al. (2012), we
employed two measures, namely ORE and FUEL. ORE is the proportion of ore exports
in the country's total exports and FUEL is the proportion of gas and oil exports in the
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country's total exports. These ratios estimate the degree to which natural resources are
present in a particular country. The data are obtained from the World Development
Indicators (WDI).
Strategic assets. Strategic assets refer to a country's assets in technology, brands, and
innovative abilities. Referring to Buckley et al. (2007, 2012), we take the patents
(PATENT) applied for by residents and non-residents in a country to measure the
degree of a country's strategic assets. We use logarithmic forms of the number of
patents applied for to normalise the data. The data are obtained from the World
Development Indicators (WDI).
Trade. Research has shown that trade and FDI have a strong relationship (Blomström
& Kokko, 1997; Buckley et al., 2012; OECD, 2006; Wells, 1983). Analysing Chinese
OFDI between 1984 and 2001, Buckley et al. (2007) show that Chinese MNEs have a
‘FDI promoting exports’ strategy. Prior research (see e.g. Zhou, 1996) suggests that
Chinese firms often engage in international business while imitating their peers. We
calculated the Trade variable by calculating the proportion of trade volume between
China and particular host countries to the country’s total international trade volume
(Cheung et al., 2012; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). The data for trade was obtained from
the website of World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) - a joint initiative of the World
Bank and UNCTAD.
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Geographic distance. FDI decisions are likely to be affected by geographic distance.
Geographically closer markets decrease transaction costs and attract cross-border
M&A (Buckley & Casson, 1981). Empirically, many Asian MNEs prefer to enter into
geographically close countries. Both Matsushita and Haier’s initial internationalization
stage focused on Southeast Asia to build volume and international experience (Yang et
al., 2009). Nevertheless, some Chinese MNEs in high-tech sectors, such as Huawei and
Lenovo, enter markets that are geographically distant, in order to acquiring strategic
knowledge assets. Geographic distance (GDIS) was calculated by taking the logarithm
of the straight line distance from Beijing to the capital city in each target country
(Buckley et al., 2007; Feenstra, 2003).
Common border. We additionally control for countries with shared borders (dummy
variable Border = 1) with China. Chinese firms are more likely to undertake trade and
investment with neighbouring countries. The data on GDIS and Border are obtained
from CEPII in France.
Common language. Following most research, we also control for the cultural distance
between China and host countries by considering the language. When the language is
the same, dummy variable LANG is coded 1, otherwise 0.
RESULTS
Push Factors – Chinese Institutional Framework
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Our results, presented in tables 3 and 4, show the effect of Chinese central government
policy direction. As can be seen from the results, our Hypothesis 1a, the ‘Go Global’
policy has pushed Chinese cross-border M&As into countries that have a larger pool of
strategic assets, is supported. Hypothesis 1b, that Chinese MNEs invest a larger volume
of funds in cross-border M&As in countries that have larger pool of strategic assets, is
not supported. We measured the effect of government direction by splitting our sample
in time. Table 4 shows the results for the period from 2002 to 2011, to capture the effect
of the ‘Go Global’ policy. Results reveal that patents (our measure for strategic assets
availability in host countries) gain significance in the post 2002 period. This indicates
that the location choice of Chinese MNEs has changed. Chinese MNEs now prefer to
enter into countries for strategic asset seeking, including technology and brands (Deng,
2009; Zhang et al., 2011). In recent years, we have witnessed many cases of Chinese
MNEs targeting firms in more advanced economies in Western Europe and the USA,
for instance the acquisition of Volvo in Sweden by Geely and acquisition of IBM’s
personal computer business in the USA by Lenovo, which supports our findings.
However, it is interesting to know that although Chinese firms show location choice
preferences towards such advanced countries, their real volume of investment is not
significantly affected by the endowment of strategic assets in these economies. This is
probably because Chinese MNEs are still in their infancy in seeking strategic assets and
therefore are not selectively targeting western firms. Thus, we argue that although their
location choice is changing, advanced countries have still not become major hub for
Chinese M&As in terms of investment volumes.
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*****Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here*****
Pull Factors – Chinese Institutional Framework
The results reported in Table 3 show the impact of the institutional framework in host
countries - which is measured in two different ways. Model 1 represents the host
country’s formal institutions in terms of government stability, and Model 2 shows the
quality of law and order. Results in both models are consistent and therefore they can be
seen as a robustness check. Tables 3 and 4 show that political risk in host countries does
not negatively influence the location choice decisions of Chinese MNEs, supporting
our Hypotheses 2a. However, there is a positive association with the scale of
cross-border M&As, meaning that Chinese firms prefer to undertake larger
cross-border M&As in countries that have a poor record of law and order (Model 2).
This partly confirms our Hypothesis 2b that Chinese MNEs invest more in riskier
locations. Our results did not show significance for government stability (Model 1) on
the actual amount of investment, which indicates that Chinese MNEs may invest in
countries where the government may not be stable. This indifference towards
government stability also reflects the risk taking abilities of Chinese MNEs.
It is also important to note that post 2002 Chinese MNEs are increasingly attracted
towards locations that are riskier (see Table 4). As suggested earlier, the financial
support and direction from the Chinese government under the ‘Go Global’ policy may
have influenced the unconventional location choices made by Chinese MNEs (Buckley
et al., 2007; Dohse et al., 2012). This reflects a changing character of Chinese MNEs
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towards host country risk. We further infer that the experience of operating at home,
where the institutions are underdeveloped, also gives Chinese MNEs a specific
competitive advantage over western MNEs when operating in countries with
underdeveloped institutions, i.e. countries with high risk (Buckley et al., 2007; Quer et
al., 2012). This allows Chinese MNEs to operate in host countries such as Sudan, Iraq
and Syria that do not offer high quality institutions. The perverse behaviour towards
host country risk, due to the poor quality of institutions, confirms prior research which
suggests that Chinese MNEs either seeks to maximise economic rent or they have
mechanisms through which they reduce the impact of such risk on the firm, e.g. prior
experience and the Chinese government’s ties with host countries. Further, China
influences many developing countries because of its high share of their inward FDI,
making China a strategic partner in their growth efforts (Buckley, Enderwick, Kafouros,
Forsans, Voss & Munjal, 2014).
Moreover, their ‘risk-seeking’ motive may be caused by the dominance of SOEs
(Mork et al., 2008), or the low quality of governance in private firms. Chinese firms,
especially SOEs, have enjoyed privileged access to cheap money, which spurs them to
invest abroad (Buckley et al., 2007). Access to government finance reduces the
commercial or financial risks of OFDI, mitigating institutional distance, and subsidizes
less profitable technology. The ability of Chinese SOE’s to derive benefits from the
imperfect domestic capital market also creates a specific ownership advantage (Voss et
al., 2008) which is often described as an ‘unfair’ capital cost advantage (Globerman &
Shapiro, 2009). Furthermore, decisions of Chinese MNEs to invest abroad are often
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based on the short term goals of top Chinese SOE bureaucrats. These bureaucrats are
generally on a short length of tenure during which they are more interested in the
execution of ‘flagship’ projects which can help them in their career progression and
also in appropriating funds through buying firms in host countries that have poor
governance structures. Thus, the short length of tenure of these top executives in
Chinese SOEs also militates against a long run time horizon in decision making.
Motives of Cross-border M&As
We used standard control variables to capture the major motives for undertaking FDI.
The host country's GDP is significantly positive in the two-stage regressions, while the
host GDP per capita only has a significantly positive effect in the scale model (see Table
3). The insignificance of the GDP growth rate indicates that China's overseas M&As do
not involve sufficient consideration for the market potential in the target country, i.e.
Chinese firms do not show a long-term consideration of the host country’s economic
potential. This may be because the intention is to repatriate the acquired natural
resources, technology and skills to China. The host country of the investment is often
not the final target market. However, with the ‘Go Global’ Policy, the attitude of
Chinese MNEs towards the economic potential of the host country is changing as all
three market parameters gain significance in their location choice decisions (Table 4).
However, the insignificance of these three parameters still remains in the deciding of
the actual amount of investment.
In terms of natural resources, the coefficient of the ORE variable is significantly
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positive for location choice, while those of FUEL are only significantly positive in the
analysis of investment scale, in both Tables 3 and 4. We deduce that the amount of
investment in extraction of natural resources is often subject to the host country’s
government approval and therefore Chinese MNEs will be attracted towards locations
that have a large endowment of natural resources but their actual investment may not be
purely based on the availability of natural resources. Conversely, whether M&As in the
gas and oil industry can be successful is subject to China’s diplomatic relations with the
target country; but after the M&A agreement is made, the scale of investment is more
dependent on the abundance of these resources in the host country. Thus, the
destination of Chinese firms’ investment is likely to be in line with the government’s
agenda of national economic development. Since 1992, the central government has had
a clear objective to use oil and gas resources both in China and in target foreign
countries in which the Chinese government establishes diplomatic ties. CNPC’s
acquisition in Peru, SINOPEC’s M&As in Asia, the Middle East and South America,
and CNOOC’s acquisition of Spanish firm Repsol’s oil field in Indonesia are all
examples of targeted investments. In line with some previous studies, we argue that the
idiosyncrasy of China’s institutional environment at home provides additional
explanations for Chinese OFDI because an important part of the Chinese OFDI has
been directed at countries having close political and ideological ties with China, many
of which have a high political risk, but abundant natural resources (Andreff, 2013; Cui
& Jiang, 2010; Quer et al., 2012). Li and Liang (2012) suggest that the puzzle of why
Chinese OFDI goes to high political risk countries is not because of their risk
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preference but because of good political relations with China, which in fact reduce risk.
In addition, the Trade coefficient is significantly positive in location choice
decisions, in both tables 3 and 4, indicating that the more a country has tight trade ties
with China, the greater is the probability of Chinese M&A in that country. However, the
investment scale is not dependent on the trade intensity of the host country with China.
Trade ties may help Chinese acquirers better to understand potential target countries,
and then to reduce information search costs. This finding is similar to the trade-based
FDI pattern of South Korean firms (Hong and Kim, 2003). Trade policy, specifically
export promotion, is an important push factor for China’s cross-border M&As.
Finally, in both tables 3 and 4, a common language and a joint border both
positively influence the location choice of China’s M&As but not the amount of their
investments. Geographic distance, on the other hand, negatively affects the location
choices of Chinese MNEs. Some previous studies using Hofstede's index or the number
of immigrants from the home country to measure cultural linkages between two
countries also suggest that cultural proximity affects Chinese OFDI (Bertrand et al.,
2004; Buckley et al., 2007; Cui & Jiang, 2010). However, our study reveals that it is
only the location choice decisions which are affected by language, joint border, and
geographic distance while the actual amount of investment is based on the motives of
Chinese MNEs and the institutional setup in home and host countries.
DISCUSSION
Based on the institutional framework at home and host countries, this study applies
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Heckman’s two-stage model to analyse empirically the location strategies of Chinese
cross-border M&As during the period 1985–2011 and across 150 economies. The
results show that both institutional factors in China and in the host countries are
important location determinants. In addition, different languages and non-adjacent
border are investment barriers for Chinese MNEs.
The ‘Go Global’ policy pushed Chinese MNEs to locate increasingly in countries
with abundant strategic assets. However, Chinese MNEs display a changing character
when making on cross-border M&As. Since the launch of the ‘Go Global’ policy, their
risk indifference towards the host location is changing into risk preference. Both
location choice and amount of investment of Chinese M&As are positively affected by
the poor institutional fabric of the host country, which may damage the firm’s long term
profitability.
Theoretical Contributions
The current study makes three contributions to IB research on Chinese OFDI. First, we
construct a theoretical framework which is different from the traditional industry-based
view and the resource-based view. By considering China’s specific development stage,
we mainly focus on Push-Pull institutional factors in China and in the host country.
Second, we examine the M&A mode in contrast to greenfield investments, used in
previous studies. Third, we use the Heckman two-stage model to verify quantitatively
our theoretical hypotheses, which examines both the location choice decision and the
real volume of M&As as two different stages in the FDI decision process.
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Limitations and Future Research Directions
Further in-depth research on Chinese cross-border M&As can be developed in two
ways. First, an investigation into the firm level issues of M&A, using more detailed
firm-level data; for instance, the impact of ownership on the firm’s decision to locate
and its motives in conducting M&As. Second, regional disparity is a feature of China,
so institutional factors at home are likely to vary at the regional or sub-regional level,
and therefore, the regional heterogeneity of institutional factors needs to be taken into
account in future studies.
Managerial Implications
The study offers managerial implications. It suggests that Chinese MNEs need to avoid
being ‘shortsighted’. By strict and logical econometric analysis, we show that Chinese
acquirers lack a long term horizon as they show risk perverse behaviour in their
overseas M&As. Some ‘loophole-seeking’ behaviour may distort the initial intention of
the ‘Go Global’ policy, such as rent-seeking in high risk countries, or the irrational use
of retained earnings to fund ‘flagship’ projects rather than investments with high
economic returns. These behaviours disturb the competitive mechanism and intensify
the existing imperfect capital market (for instance, illegal loans, corruption, and
embezzling public funds for personal careers as bureaucrats) (Morck et al., 2008; Voss
et al., 2008). Moreover, China’s lack of a ‘risk-protection’ system, which evaluates
potential investment risk in target countries, is also a hidden problem for Chinese OFDI.
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Therefore, financial regulations and corporate governance at the firm level need to be
strengthened, and the rational design of incentive policies and a ‘risk-protection’
system of OFDI environment should also be implemented.
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Table 1. Main destinations of China’s cross-border M&A（1985-2011）
Destination
No. of M&As completed Volume of M&As completed（million US$）
No. of M&As Ratio(%）
Total M&As
volume
Average volume per
M&As
Hong Kong 392 32.89 21914.38 55.90
US 149 12.50 15334.45 102.92
Australia 126 10.57 17134.19 135.99
Singapore 70 5.87 2140.27 30.58
Canada 65 5.45 19361.15 297.86
Japan 45 3.78 953.21 21.18
Germany 26 2.18 176.39 6.78
UK 21 1.76 7548.02 359.43
France 20 1.68 4411.89 220.59
Taiwan 18 1.51 68.00 3.78
South Korea 17 1.43 1396.04 82.12
Indonesia 15 1.26 1296.55 86.44
Netherlands 15 1.26 882.09 58.81
Malaysia 14 1.17 112.59 8.04
Italy 13 1.09 775.46 59.65
Mongolia 12 1.01 175.30 14.61
Brazil 11 0.92 12689.28 1153.57
New Zealand 9 0.76 153.00 17.00
Source: calculated by the authors from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database
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Table 2. Definitions and statistics description of variables
VARIABLES NAME Definition
Avera
ge
Standard
Deviation
Minimu
m
Maximu
m
Dependent TRANV
Transaction volume of
M&A
17.94 2.77 9.95 22.86
Host formal
institutions
Measure 1 Government stability 1.98 0.36 -0.41 2.48
Measure 2 Legal and social order 1.20 0.49 -0.88 1.79
Host informal
institutions
LANG Common language 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Control variables
GDP GDP 10.00 2.08 4.87 16.52
GDPP GDP per capita 7.83 1.68 4.16 11.65
GDPG GDP growth rate 3.41 6.32 -66.12 106.28
ORE
Ore resource
endowment
5.66 12.49 0.00 88.81
FUEL
Oil and gas resource
endowment
12.04 24.59 0.00 99.95
PATENT Strategic assets 0.13 7.15 -6.91 13.13
GDIS Geographic distance 9.00 0.57 7.02 9.86
BORDER Common border 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
TRADE Trade dependence 5.13 8.26 0.00 85.15
Excluded variables ENTCOST Entry cost 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Source: arranged by the authors based on original data
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Table 3. Regression results of Heckman’s two-stage (1985-2011)
Variables Model 1 Institution: Government stability Model 2 Institution: Legal and social order
Location choice M&As scale Location choice M&As scale
GDP 0.3555*** 0.6920 0.3556*** 0.5989
(0.0414) (0.4788) (0.0413) (0.4684)
GDPPC 0.0730 0.3695 0.0976 0.7679*
(0.0538) (0.3200) (0.0673) (0.4318)
GDPG -0.0025 0.0125 -0.0048 -0.0189
(0.0159) (0.0851) (0.0156) (0.0817)
ORE 0.0178*** 0.0364 0.0184*** 0.0389
(0.0039) (0.0320) (0.0039) (0.0320)
FUEL 0.0023 0.0301** 0.0020 0.0290**
(0.0023) (0.0134) (0.0023) (0.0133)
PATENT 0.0150 0.0074 0.0153 0.0078
(0.0107) (0.0534) (0.0106) (0.0532)
TRADE 0.0095*** 0.0181 0.0094*** 0.0182
(0.0021) (0.0174) (0.0021) (0.0170)
BORDER 0.6213*** 2.0057 0.6422*** 2.1347
(0.2219) (1.4449) (0.2268) (1.4520)
LANG 1.6724*** 2.3564 1.6365*** 1.8282
(0.2296) (2.3850) (0.2294) (2.2800)
GDIS -0.2171** 0.2796 -0.2373** 0.0515
(0.0964) (0.3969) (0.0981) (0.4116)
INSTITUTION -0.2587 -2.0514 -0.1722 -1.6722*
(0.2711) (1.3413) (0.1988) (0.9697)
ENTCOST -0.3007** -0.3150**
(0.1235) (0.1250)
Lambda 1.6951 1.7449
(1.8337) (1.7719)
Constant -9.7290 5.353 -10.0316 2.9566
(0.0000) (9.1118) (0.0000) (9.1459)
Observations 2,768 2,768 2,765 2,765
Notes: 1) standard error is reported in parenthesis; ***, **, and * represents respectively statistically
significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%; year dummy is integrated for controlling macro-economic impact.
Below is the same.
2) In each model, the first column presents the estimation results regarding the location choice of China's
cross-border M&A, while the second column is the estimation results regarding the decision making on
M&A scale.
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Table 4. Regression results of Heckman’s two-stage (2002-2011)
Variables Model 1 Institution: Government stability Model 2 Institution: Legal and social order
Location choice M&As scale Location choice M&As scale
GDP 0.3371*** 0.8845* 0.3318*** 0.7608
(0.0500) (0.4960) (0.0497) (0.4699)
GDPPC 0.1261* 0.4411 0.2276*** 1.0271
(0.0662) (0.4341) (0.0865) (0.6509)
GDPG 0.0372* 0.0049 0.0329* -0.0263
(0.0190) (0.1268) (0.0188) (0.1210)
ORE 0.0139*** 0.0442 0.0162*** 0.0515
(0.0049) (0.0328) (0.0050) (0.0338)
FUEL 0.0022 0.0342** 0.0012 0.0315**
(0.0027) (0.0159) (0.0027) (0.0158)
PATENT 0.0312** 0.0283 0.0337** 0.0282
(0.0137) (0.0862) (0.0138) (0.0862)
TRADE 0.0094*** 0.0264 0.0091*** 0.0267
(0.0022) (0.0197) (0.0022) (0.0188)
BORDER 0.4603* 2.4426 0.5229* 2.4964
(0.2676) (1.5801) (0.2740) (1.5929)
LANG 1.5686*** 2.6012 1.3988*** 1.8184
(0.3394) (2.4996) (0.3365) (2.1782)
GDIS -0.3782*** 0.0709 -0.4604*** -0.2842
(0.1243) (0.5883) (0.1267) (0.6362)
INSTITUTION -0.7866** -2.9576 -0.6037** -2.4861*
(0.3796) (1.9021) (0.2561) (1.4785)
ENTCOST -0.3084** -0.3543**
(0.1524) (0.1536)
Lambda 2.3061 2.3246
(2.0464) (1.9015)
Constant -1.4989 5.0223 -2.4345* 1.6472
(1.4455) (7.8820) (1.2852) (8.4203)
Observations 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192
Notes: 1) standard error is reported in parenthesis; ***, **, and * represents respectively statistically
significant level at 1%, 5% and 10%; year dummy is integrated for controlling macro-economic impact.
Below is the same.
2) In each model, the first column presents the estimation results regarding the location choice of China's
cross-border M&A, while the second column is the estimation results regarding the decision making on
M&A scale.
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Source: calculated by the authors from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database
Figure 1. Chinese overseas M&As from 1985 to 2011
Figure 2. Logic of Heckman’s two-stage model
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